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Asian Americans Challenge the Official Racial Nationalism of the United States
Frank H. Wu
Introduction
The very definition of “Asian American,” which historically has been based upon the formal
exclusion of this grouping, demonstrates the racial nationalism of the United States.1 Racial
nationalism is not new.2 It has been the norm in America (and arguably remains the norm
elsewhere, including throughout Asia) to identify belonging to a shared race as essential to
membership within a nation-state.3 This essay uses the Wong Kim Ark case, recognizing
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birthright citizenship for an individual of Chinese descent, and the Korematsu case, allowing
the World War II internment of Japanese Americans, as a means of showing how government
officials conceived of equal membership in society as being controlled by ancestry. The
arguments of the solicitor general on behalf of the executive branch in United States v. Wong
Kim Ark (1898) and the analysis of the majority of the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United
States (1944) are presented, in their own words, confirming these opinions were explicit;
taking the reasoning seriously, at face value, reveals that race was more important than
citizenship, so that Asian Americans were deemed more Asian than American whatever their
legal status. In both instances, Asian Americans were unequivocally members of groups, not
individuals. They were anonymous and representative, their ascribed characteristics assumed
to be typical. The cases of Chae Chan Ping and Kaoru Yamataya are styled in the official
reports as “the Chinese Exclusion Case” and “the Japanese Immigrant Case,” respectively, the
very titles signifying they are about abstract exemplars rather than actual persons.4
The Invention of Chinese Americans
Wong Kim Ark, born in San Francisco, of parents from China, sought a declaration that he was
a citizen of the United States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.5 His case was decided
by the Supreme Court in 1898. Wong had to assert citizenship to regain entry to his homeland
after a trip to visit his parents in their homeland to which they had returned after two decades
in the new world. Wong Kim Ark was a restaurant worker, and his case, like others of the era,
was backed by community associations.
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Reconceptualizing Asian-American Identity,” UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal, v. 22, n. 1: 1–28 (2017).
China is increasingly asserting its authority over dual nationals as Chinese only, not entitled to any protection
that otherwise would be extended to the holder of a non-Chinese passport, including for extraterritorial
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A pair of related axioms was accepted by all parties. If he were a Chinese national
seeking initial entry, not a US national, he would have been excluded, and properly so. If he
were a US national, however, he would have enjoyed the right of entry like any other
American.6 The assertion that he was Chinese, not American, because of his race begs the
question of whether race is dispositive, Chinese and American being mutually exclusive.7
The outline of Wong’s life was ordinary. The court opened, “Wong Kim Ark, ever since
his birth, has had but one residence, to-wit, in California, within the United States, and has
there resided, claiming to be a citizen of the United States, and has never lost or changed that
residence, or gained or acquired another residence, and neither he nor his parents acting for
him ever renounced his allegiance to the United States, or did or committed any act or thing to
exclude him therefrom.”8 The court mentioned that Wong had taken an earlier voyage to
China, as a minor, and been permitted to return without fuss. Of consequence was something
Wong’s elders were not: they “were never employed in any diplomatic or official capacity
under the Emperor of China.”9
Context is needed to comprehend Wong’s predicament. He took for granted, since the
precedent was recent and as severely stated as possible, that the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882 (and successive amendments) was constitutional as an exercise of the “plenary power”
associated with sovereignty. That is, he did not contest the proposition that if he were Chinese
in terms of citizenship, he could be kept out, like other Chinese citizens. Likewise, if he had
been accompanied by a brother or a cousin, or another Chinese from his ancestral village who
had not ever set foot on American territory, all of them would be turned away without
recourse. This was a line drawn on the basis of race beyond a line drawn on the basis of
citizenship, separating Chinese from other foreigners. A line based on citizenship by definition
could not have distinguished further among noncitizens. It is not a pure xenophobia, hostility
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toward strangers, and to characterize it as such understates the antagonism involved.10
Although some might regard xenophobia as tantamount to racism, for the justices the ability
to control the borders was intrinsic to sovereignty itself, and likely many would agree that a
nation must be able to control its borders in order to be a nation at all.11 That is consistent
with the campaign against Chinese foreigners, which was ethnically specific. Among the
agitators against the Chinese were white foreigners, such as Denis Kearney, of County Cork,
Ireland.12 Moreover, Wong’s parents, and any other Chinese person not born within the
United States, were ineligible to naturalize.13 Even if they had arrived in a legitimate
manner—though to be “illegal” in that era had altogether different connotations than
developed later—they were not “free white persons” who could acquire United States
citizenship.14 Asians were turned into perpetual foreigners, “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”
(The bar was reiterated as to Japanese and South Asians in the Ozawa and Thind cases,
respectively, a generation later.15 A few Asians, such as the original “Siamese” twins, Chang
and Eng Bunker, of Chinese background, managed to evade the limitation due to erratic
enforcement.)16
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Wong grounded his hope on the Fourteenth Amendment.17 One of three
Reconstruction amendments enacted after the Civil War to undo the Dred Scott v. Sandford
decision that had rendered Blacks noncitizens, the opening clause states: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.”18 During debate on the proposal,
legislators were aware of the so-called “Chinese problem,” and opponents of its passage
warned that it would benefit Chinese as well.19
Despite the plain language of the text, the government opposed Wong’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to gain his liberty. The solicitor general, who is the official
representative of the government, made a simple argument.20 He insisted that all members of
the Wong family were subjects of the Chinese emperor. Since there was no doubt that Wong’s
parents could be excluded and there also was no doubt that they could be prevented from
naturalizing, which had the cumulative effect of prohibiting them from ever becoming United
States citizens, then so too Wong himself was relegated to that status. He could not occupy any
better position than they could. This is an a fortiori argument. It is a common line of legal
argument, meaning an argument from the stronger case, or, in the colloquial “all the more so,”
such that if X (Wong’s parents) end up with a particular outcome and if Y (Wong) has a
weaker claim than X, then logically Y cannot end up with a better outcome then X. The
premise is that Wong’s status is inherited, lineal. Inferior status, like other stigma, would be
passed from generation to generation. The government briefs contain extensive citations to
venerable sources of international law to the effect that citizenship by blood (jus sanguinus),
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not soil (jus soli), has been more prevalent. (Incidentally, the legal as well as the popular
understanding of these matters referenced the Chinese as a “race,” as it did the Irish and
others; “race” functioned then as “ethnicity” later would in the consolidation of racial groups
into whiteness.)
The solicitor general also engaged with the clause about jurisdiction. Comparing Native
Americans and diplomats, he argued that even though Wong was subject to United States law,
he was not within the United States jurisdiction for these purposes. He remained subject to
Chinese jurisdiction, disqualifying him from availing himself of the benefit of American
jurisdiction.
The rational explication of these ostensibly neutral principles is belied by the solicitor
general’s own rhetoric. He summed up his objections to Wong as follows:
There certainly should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would
be sacred from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage. Are Chinese
children born in the country to share with the descendants of the patriots of the
American Revolution the exalted qualification of being eligible to the Presidency of the
nation, conferred by the Constitution in recognition of the importance and dignity of
citizenship by birth? If so, then verily there has been a most degenerate departure from
the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and surely in that case American citizenship is
not worth having.21
Presumably the solicitor general would have been appalled by the prospect that a Chinese
child would also be a descendant of a patriot of the American Revolution.22 In the
government’s reply brief, counsel elaborated that “characteristics of the Chinaman . . . seemed
to preclude him from actual citizenship here,” and requested the court take notice, as it had
stated in dicta earlier, that Chinese laborers were “apparently incapable of assimilating with
our people.”23 The language is telling. It presumes there is a body of “our people.” That would
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implicitly be whites. (“Negroes” are referenced separately throughout as was customary at the
time.) The government sought to contain the Fourteenth Amendment to abolition of slavery
and not conferral of citizenship.24
The Supreme Court held that Wong was a citizen, and, therefore, he could enter, or,
more to the point, return. In doing so, the justices expressly set forth a universal principle. The
clause was intended to extend citizenship especially to free Blacks, “But the opening words,
‘All persons born,’ are general, not to say universal, restricted only by place and jurisdiction,
and not by color or race.”25 According to the court, excluded were only Native American
children, “standing in a peculiar relationship to the National Government, unknown to the
common law” of England; and “the two classes of cases,” comprised of “children born of alien
enemies in hostile occupation” and “children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state,”
in keeping with Anglo-American common law of time immemorial.26 The text was
“peremptory and explicit.”27
Thus the category of Chinese American was created. Until the Chinese Exclusion Repeal
Act of 1943, this social station would be reserved for the native-born. Although the ruling was
progress, it would be an error of excessive celebration to suppose that citizenship for Chinese
Americans was the same as citizenship for white Americans. To the contrary, it was much
more similar to citizenship for Black Americans.
In the same era, the Supreme Court handed down Plessy v. Ferguson, enshrining the
doctrine of “separate but equal” as the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s other
guarantee, of “equal protection of the laws.”28 The sole dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan
(the first), has been celebrated ever since for penning the phrase “color-blind” to describe the
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Constitution. The felicitous phrase concealed his true conviction that formal disregard for race
would reinforce white supremacy for all time.29 Among Harlan’s objections to the separation
of African American passengers in railroad travel was its illogic.
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to
become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by the statute
in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the
United States.30
Harlan was unabashed in his antipathy for the Chinese. He joined the dissent in Wong Kim Ark.
He would have denied Wong citizenship.31
A generation later, the Supreme Court was confronted with the assignment of Chinese
American schoolchildren to Black schools, rather than white schools, in the de jure segregated
South. In a cursory opinion, the court offered a racial deduction: “Most of the cases cited arose,
it is true, over the establishment of separate schools as between white pupils and black pupils;
but we cannot think that the question is any different, or that any different result can be
reached, assuming the cases [involving Blacks] to be rightly decided, where the issue is as
between white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races.”32 It would not be until the 1954
decision of Brown v. Board of Education, the most celebrated accomplishment of Chief Justice
Earl Warren, that school segregation, and by implication all segregation in public places, was
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struck down. The early effort to undo the practice by Chinese Americans was recalled only as
an anomaly.
The Internment of Japanese Americans
Fred Korematsu, born in Oakland of Japanese parents, sought release from an “internment”
camp during World War II.33 Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, the date that would “live in infamy” according to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
declaring war, all persons of Japanese ancestry in the designated war zone were imprisoned.34
As the United States entered a global conflict underway for years on two fronts, approximately
120,000 persons, two-thirds of them native-born citizens (pursuant of course to Wong Kim
Ark) were incarcerated without individual charges much less determinations of guilt—men,
women, children, elderly, disabled, and even veterans of the “Great War” (who had been
bestowed with citizenship under special legislation).35 FDR signed Executive Order 9066,
Congress adopted Public Law 503 to ratify it, and the military was delegated authority to
carry out plans supported by virtually all of the public. The commander of the Western
Defense, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, stated concisely, “A Jap’s a Jap, and that’s all there
is to it.”36 He repeated similar sentiments lest there be uncertainty about the meaning: “In the
war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese
33

See Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring Conviction: Fred Korematsu and His Quest for Justice (Seattle, WA: U.

Washington Press, 2015). The emerging consensus deems “internment” a euphemism for “imprisonment.” The
government at the time even used the term “concentration camp.” See Densho Project, “Terminology,” available
at https://densho.org/terminology/ (accessed Feb. 13, 2022). See generally Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without
Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II, rev. ed. (New York: Hill & Wang, 2004); Roger Daniels, Concentration
Camps: North America Japanese in the United States and Canada During World War II (Malabar, FL: 1981); Greg
Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America (New York: Columbia U. Press, 2009);
Eric Y. Yamamoto, et al., Race, Rights & Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment 2nd ed. (New
York: Aspen Publishers, 2013).
34

See Emily S. Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory (Durham, N.C.: Duke

U. Press, 2003).
35

Lucy E. Salyer, “Baptism by Fire: Race, Military Service, and U.S. Citizenship Policy, 1918–1935,”

Journal of American History, v. 91, no. 3 (2004): 847–76.
36

Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese-American Internment Cases (Berkeley, CA: U.

California Press: 1993.

10
race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United
States soil, possessed of United States citizenship have become “Americanized” the racial
strains are undiluted.”37
The racially specific confinement was purportedly justified by military necessity. The
proposition was that Japanese Americans were more likely than others to commit treason,
engaging in espionage or sabotage, or otherwise lending aid and comfort to an Axis power.
That explanation about exigent circumstances was contradicted by the pre-existing prejudice
against Japanese Americans, dating back to their arrival in sizable numbers, prompting the
diplomatic crisis of school segregation in San Francisco, settled by a “gentleman’s agreement”
negotiated by President Teddy Roosevelt; the lack of interest in carrying out an analogous
program in Hawaii (situated squarely within the theatre of operations but also a plantation
economy heavily dependent on Japanese among the heterogenous laborers); and the failure to
target Italian Americans and German Americans in a similar manner (though some
individuals, almost all foreign nationals who could have naturalized if they wished to do so,
were apprehended).38 Latin American Japanese were kidnapped and handed over to the
United States for potential hostage exchange, and Alaskan Natives, for whom there was no
affection either, also were detained.39 The blue-ribbon federal commission subsequently
empaneled to investigate the internment concluded that officials were aware at the time that
Japanese Americans as a whole did not pose any greater risk than the general population.40 It
summarized that the policies were carried out due to racism, lack of leadership, and wartime
panic. The Justice Department altered its briefs at the last minute, ordering destruction of all

37
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prior drafts, at the behest of the War Department.41 Against the ethical precepts of the bar,
they omitted reference to exculpatory evidence. Worse than that, they ignored the
discrepancy between the averment it was racially impossible to sort loyal Japanese Americans
from disloyal (due to inscrutability) and the less offensive contention that there had been lack
of time for more thoughtful review.42 Even assimilation of Japanese Americans was reckoned
to be a trick.
In assessing the internment, which arguably violated the constitutional clauses
protecting due process and equal protection, respectively, the Supreme Court had four
distinct opportunities to rule definitively on its constitutionality or lack thereof. In
Hirabayashi v. United States and Yasui v. United States, the court took up only the lighter
measure of the initial curfew imposed on Japanese Americans and not the totality of the
internment that followed in a series of military orders.43 In Korematsu v. United States, the
most prominent of the cases, the court also indicated it was “being asked to pass at this time
upon the whole subsequent detention program in both assembly and relocation centers,
although the only issues framed at the trial related to petitioner's remaining in the prohibited
area in violation of the exclusion order.”44 The justices declined to do so. They instead passed
on only the exclusion and not the detention, stating: “To do more would be to go beyond the
issues raised, and to decide momentous questions not contained within the framework of the
pleadings or the evidence in this case. It will be time enough to decide the serious
constitutional issues which petitioner seeks to raise when an assembly or relocation order is
applied or is certain to be applied to him, and we have its terms before us.”45
That facile prediction could not but be disingenuous. The White House had already
announced the closure of the internment camps by then, which ensured the time would never
41
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come when the actual imprisonment was ruled upon.46 (Exclusion and detention are not
equivalent conceptually or practically. A handful of Japanese Americans, banished from the
West Coast, were able to move eastward to freedom prior to the internment.)
In Ex parte Endo, a case that has not attracted attention even from constitutional law
scholars, the court also held that the government was obligated to release those who were
concededly loyal.47 Endo had been selected by advocates for a habeas corpus petition because
of her assimilation, lack of any relationship to Japan, and her brother serving in the United
States Army, all characteristics that would make it difficult to contend with credulity that she
posed a threat.48 As in the deliberations about the internment policy, the evaluations of its
constitutionality treated Japanese Americans in the aggregate, not as individuals—even Endo
was a representative. Justice Frank Murphy, for example, dissented in Korematsu, based on
the available evidence about Japanese Americans as a community; he was concerned with
patterns and probabilities.49 The majority had fallen into the “abyss of racism.”50
To vindicate the internment, however, Justice Hugo Black, a former Ku Klux Klan
member (whom, according to Black, President Roosevelt felt was wrongly impugned for his
association with the white supremacist group),51 wrote of Korematsu in his conclusion:
Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it
unjustifiable to call them concentration camps, with all the ugly connotations that
term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast
this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt

46
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constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and, finally, because Congress, reposing
its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—
determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for
action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm
perspective of hindsight—now say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.52
There are three constructions of this excerpt that would make sense of it, specifically
the claim that Korematsu was not acted upon due to “hostility to him or his race.” A
straightforward reading makes it internally inconsistent. Without the nexus of race,
Korematsu was no different than his neighbors and co-workers. Since only race connected
Korematsu to Japan, race was at least a “but for” cause of his exclusion (and incarceration,
because they were synonymous for practical purposes).
The first possibility is Black is alluding to the Japanese government’s actions. If Japan
regarded Korematsu as Japanese (as the Chinese regarded the Wong family as Chinese), then
it is Japan and not the United States that has caused Korematsu’s loss of liberty and equality.
Any contrary belief by Korematsu (or the United States) is subordinated to Japanese racial
nationalism rather than American racial nationalism. The second possibility is that Black is
counting Korematsu as Japanese nationally as well as racially by the United States itself
irrespective of Japanese perception; he is implicitly stripped of his citizenship, so that it is
nationality and not race that distinguishes him from others. The equating of nationality and
race is necessarily circular if the issue presented is whether they are the same. The third
possibility is that Black is discounting any racial factor that is not raw bigotry—satisfying the
standard of “hostility.” As Black himself undertook to substantiate, the internment was not
tainted by an illicit motive. His formulation implies racial classifications that are rational,
based on deliberation, rather than invidious, without reflection.
These glosses on Black make him more intelligible: it cannot be maintained that
Korematsu’s predicament had nothing to do with race. They do not make Black’s thinking any
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less troubling. Black told his colleague Justice Felix Frankfurter that he would not allow
Japanese Americans who were loyal to return to the West Coast.53 In an interview given on the
condition it be published posthumously, Black defended the internment on the even more
preposterous basis of protective custody for the benefit of Japanese Americans. “People were
rightly fearful of the Japanese,” he said. “They all look alike to a person not a Jap,” he added.
Thus: “Had they attacked our shores you’d have a large number fighting with the Japanese
troops. And a lot of innocent Japanese Americans would have been shot in the panic. Under
these circumstances I saw nothing wrong with moving them away from the danger area.”54
For Black, by his own phrasing, “people” did not include “Japanese” or “Jap[s]” even if
Japanese American. Chief Justice Warren, in contrast, regretted his political expediency.55
Since Wong Kim Ark, the United States has abided by birthright citizenship. Two
Japanese Americans were accused of treason during World War II, both individuals caught in
Japan as war broke out, one being Tomoya Kawakita (the other was Iva Toguri d’Aquino,
accused of being “Tokyo Rose”). To be prosecuted for treason, he had to be a United States
citizen. Born in the United States of parents from Japan, “he was thus a citizen of the United
States by birth Amendment XIV, sec. 1, and, by reason of Japanese law, a national of Japan,” the
court stated.56 (Kawakita’s conviction was upheld; his sentence was commuted from death to
deportation.) Likewise, in the more recent litigation regarding enemy combatants who took
up arms with the Taliban against the United States, the court did not pause over citizenship.
Yaser Esam Hamdi, born in Louisiana, was a United States citizen even though he moved to
Saudi Arabia as a child.57
Finally, no account of these issues would be accurate without noting the intersection of
race and gender. White American men were able to impart citizenship to Asian women by
marrying them. Asian men (unable to naturalize) had the opposite effect of causing the
relinquishment of citizenship for white women by marrying them (notwithstanding anti-
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miscegenation laws).58 If these regulations had persisted and been enforced rigorously, Asian
Americans would have vanished into whiteness or blackness (intermarriage among people of
color generally not being policed as stringently) or disappeared altogether (since they could
not come, and bachelor settlements would leave no legitimate progeny).
Conclusion
Asian Americans were reduced to only one relevant characteristic in Wong Kim Ark and
Korematsu: race. If the government had prevailed in the former, race would have defeated
birthright. In the latter, race ultimately did overcome birthright. Nothing else about the
persons, Wong Kim Ark and Fred Korematsu, redeemed them. These controversies have
recurred. Birthright citizenship is criticized with an emphasis on Latina mothers bearing
“anchor babies.”59 Korematsu was recently overruled albeit to uphold the “travel ban” against
aliens from certain predominantly Muslim nations.60
In one of the most significant speeches in American history, part of the civic culture,
Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, the president who preserved the union, but would be
martyred, reimagined constitutional ideals as extending to African Americans. The three-fifths
compromise, vital to founding a nation by diminishing Blacks in status within the population,
was transformed by the notion of a government “of the people, by the people, for the
people.”61 Garry Wills, the eminent historian, offered a line by line reading of this
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achievement, all the more remarkable for the brevity of the oration.62 For Asian Americans,
Wong Kim Ark serves as the Gettysburg Address. Yet Korematsu bears out that citizenship is
not enough. The law is necessary but not sufficient. Asian Americans are full citizens only
through political participation.
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